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RESUMEN
En este artículo defiendo que, en contra de lo que normalmente se piensa, un contraejemplo a una teoría filosófica no es evidencia concluyente contra la teoría. Más bien,
el método de los contraejemplos permite la derivación, no de la negación de la teoría en
cuestión, sino de una disyunción, a saber “o la teoría es falsa, o un supuesto auxiliar es
falso”. Es así porque, siempre que se usa el método de los contraejemplos para intentar
refutar una teoría filosófica, hay un supuesto auxiliar que juega un papel crucial. Se trata
del supuesto según el cual emitir juicios intuitivos sobre ejemplos hipotéticos relacionados con un asunto determinado (por ejemplo, el conocimiento o los nombres propios) es
un buen método para encontrar la verdad acerca de ese asunto. Si no hay buenas razones
a favor de este supuesto, no se justifica la derivación de la negación de una teoría filosófica cuyo contenido esté en presunto conflicto con el contenido de una intuición, mediante
un argumento que use el método de los contraejemplos.
PALABRAS CLAVE: holismo de la confirmación, contraejemplo, intuición, método de los contraejemplos,
refutación.
ABSTRACT
In this paper, I argue that, contrary to common opinion, a counterexample against
a philosophical theory does not amount to conclusive evidence against that theory. Instead, the method of counterexamples allows for the derivation of a disjunction, i.e., ‘either the theory is false or an auxiliary assumption is false’, not a negation of the target
theory. This is so because, whenever the method of counterexamples is used in an attempt to refute a philosophical theory, there is a crucial auxiliary assumption that needs
to be taken into account. The auxiliary assumption is that making intuitive judgments in
response to hypothetical cases about the subject matter in question (e.g., knowledge or
proper names) is a good method for finding out truths about that subject matter. Without good reasons to think that this assumption is warranted, the negation of a philosophical
theory whose content is alleged to be in conflict with the content of an intuition cannot be
justifiably derived using an argument that employs the method of counterexamples.
KEYWORDS: Confirmation Holism; Counterexample; Intuition; Method of Counterexamples; Refutation.
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I. Introduction

A common opinion among philosophers seems to be that the
method of counterexamples allows them to conclusively refute philosophical theories. For instance, according to Martinich:
Some counterexamples simply refute a theory. If the theory is important,
then the counterexample may be derivatively important. This is especially
so when the counterexample attacks some central aspect of the theory, as
Gettier did. […] Counterexamples are a very important method in philosophical argumentation (emphasis added) [Martinich (2005), p. 118].

Likewise, Cornman, Lehrer, and Pappas write:
Finding a counterexample to a purportedly valid argument is a matter of constructing a possible world in which the premises of the argument come out
true and the conclusion comes out false. […] You can refute invalid arguments by
the use of your imagination (emphasis added) [Cornman et al (1992), p. 14].

Even Lewis, who says that “Philosophical theories are never refuted
conclusively,” qualifies that by adding “Or hardly ever, Gödel and Gettier
may have done it” (emphasis added) [Lewis (1983), p. x; quoted in Livengood et al (2012), p. 39]. Here are two alleged examples of the method of
counterexamples at work:
First example. It is often said that “the JTB analysis was refuted by
Edmund Gettier” (emphasis added) [Williamson (2011b), p. 209]. In his
seminal paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” Gettier (1963) presents counterexamples to the Justified True Belief (JTB) analysis of
knowledge, according to which S knows that p if and only if p is true, S
believes that p, and S is justified in believing that p. Gettier’s argument
against JTB can be summed up as follows:
1. If knowledge is JTB, then S knows that p in Gettier cases.
2. It is not the case that S knows that p in Gettier cases.
3. Therefore, it is not the case that knowledge is JTB.
One gets premise (2) in this argument against JTB by considering Gettier
cases and intuitively judging that S does not know that p in those cases.1
Then, the content of this intuitive judgment, namely, <S does not know
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that p in Gettier cases>, is used as a premise in an argument that is taken
to amount to a conclusive refutation of JTB.2
Second example. It is often said that “Kripke refuted specific proposals
for descriptive analyses according to which ordinary proper names have
their referents semantically fixed by descriptions commonly associated
with them” (emphasis added) [Soames (2007), p. 302]. In his seminal
book, Naming and Necessity, Kripke (1980) presents several counterexamples to the Description Theory of Names, according to which a name
has the semantic value of a definite description, e.g., ‘Kripke’ = ‘the author of Naming and Necessity’. Kripke’s argument against the Description
Theory of Names can be summed up as follows:
1. If names are definite descriptions, then ‘Gödel’ = ‘the person
who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic’ in the GödelSchmidt case.
2. It is not the case that ‘Gödel’ = ‘the person who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic’ in the Gödel-Schmidt case.
3. Therefore, it is not the case that names are definite descriptions.
One gets premise (2) in this argument against the Description Theory of
Names by considering the Gödel-Schmidt case and intuitively judging
that ‘Gödel’ still refers to Gödel even though ‘Gödel’ does not refer to
the person who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. Then, the content of this intuitive judgment, namely, <Gödel ≠ the person who
proved the incompleteness of arithmetic>, is used as a premise in an argument that is taken to amount to a conclusive refutation of the Description Theory of Names.3
Accordingly, the Method of Counterexamples (MCE) consists of
the following two steps:
Step 1. Considering a hypothetical case C is supposed to elicit an intuitive judgment J whose content is incompatible with a philosophical theory T.
Step 2. Using modus tollens to argue as follows:
T⟶J
¬J
∴ ¬T
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In this paper, I argue that arguments of this form that employ (MCE) do
not amount to conclusive refutations of philosophical theories. In other
words, contrary to common opinion, I argue that (MCE) cannot be used
to conclusively refute a philosophical theory, since there is a crucial auxiliary assumption that must be taken into consideration. The auxiliary assumption is that making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical
cases about the subject matter in question (e.g., knowledge or proper
names) is a good method for finding out truths about that subject matter. My overall argument, then, runs as follows:
1. An argument that employs (MCE) amounts to a refutation of a
philosophical theory T only if the modus tollens argument used to
refute T implies ¬T.
2. It is not the case that the modus tollens argument used to refute T
implies ¬T. (Instead, it implies ¬T  ¬A, where A is an auxiliary
assumption to the effect that making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases is a good method of finding out
philosophical truths.)
3. Therefore, it is not the case that an argument that employs
(MCE) amounts to a refutation of a philosophical theory T.
This argument is deductively valid. In what follows, then, I flesh out the
premises of this overall argument by drawing on the notion of confirmation holism.
II. CONFIRMATION HOLISM
In philosophy of science, confirmation holism is the idea that, since
the empirical content of a theory cannot be clearly separated from the
other components of the theory, when the theory makes a prediction
that is not borne out by experimentation and/or observation, logic alone
does not tell us which component of the theory should be rejected. As
Okasha writes:
According to the doctrine of confirmation holism, also known as the
‘Quine-Duhem’ thesis, the empirical content of a scientific theory cannot
be parcelled out individually among the constituent components of the
theory. Thus when a theory makes an empirical prediction which turns out
to be false, it will not be automatically obvious where to lay the blame, i.e.,
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which component of the theory to reject. Logic tells us there is an error
somewhere in the set of statements which implies the false prediction, but
does not tell us where. So there will be various ways of modifying our theory to inactivate the false implication [Okasha (2002), p. 306].

Accordingly, as far as scientific theories and their predictions are concerned, there is no straightforward derivation like the one outlined above
in Step 2 of (MCE) because, by itself, T does not imply any predictions.
There are always background assumptions or auxiliary hypotheses [Okasha
(2011), p. 224].
Hence, when T’s prediction is not borne out by experimentation
and/or observation, all that we can justifiably infer from that is that either T is false or that one of the auxiliary assumptions is false. That is:
(T  A) ⟶ P
¬P
∴ ¬T  ¬A
For example, when Copernicus first proposed his heliocentric model, his
opponents objected that the heliocentric model is inconsistent with observations. More specifically, they argued roughly as follows:
1. If Copernicus’ heliocentric model were accurate, then we would
observe stellar parallax.
2. We do not observe stellar parallax.
3. Therefore, Copernicus’ heliocentric model is inaccurate.
As we now know, stellar parallax is detectable only with the aid of sophisticated telescopes. So, this argument against Copernicus’ heliocentric
model fails to amount to a conclusive refutation of the heliocentric model because Copernicus’ opponents were making a crucial assumption.
That is, they assumed that the fixed stars are relatively close to Earth,
such that stellar parallax would be observable with the naked eye.
So, to take this auxiliary assumption into account, their argument
against Copernicus’ heliocentric model should be revised as follows:
1. If Copernicus’ heliocentric model were accurate, and if the fixed

stars are relatively close to Earth, such that stellar parallax would
be observable with the naked eye, then we would observe stellar
parallax.
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2. We do not observe stellar parallax.
3. Therefore, either Copernicus’ heliocentric model is inaccurate or
the fixed stars are not relatively close to Earth, such that stellar
parallax would be observable with the naked eye.

As we now know, Copernicus’ opponents were mistaken in assuming
that the fixed stars are relatively close to Earth, such that stellar parallax
would be observable with the naked eye. Very sophisticated instruments
are needed in order to detect stellar parallax.
III. DISCONFIRMATION AND THE METHOD OF COUNTEREXAMPLES
Now, applying the lessons of confirmation holism to (MCE), the
modus tollens argument in Step 2 needs to be revised as follows:
(T  A) ⟶ J
¬J
∴ ¬T  ¬A
After all, the claim that we would have a certain intuitive response to a
hypothetical case C is an empirical claim: we either have that intuitive response or we don’t. And the only way to find out is to actually consider
C and see how we intuitively respond. If this is correct, then the following auxiliary assumption needs to be taken into account whenever
(MCE) is used in an attempt to refute a philosophical theory T:
(AA) Making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases
is a good method for finding out truths about the subject
matter of those cases.
For example, as far as the Gettier counterexample against JTB is concerned, we need to add the following auxiliary assumption to the argument:
(A1) Making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases
about knowledge is a good method for finding out truths
about the analysis of knowledge.
Accordingly, Gettier’s argument against JTB needs to be revised as follows:
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1. If (K = JTB) and (A1), then S knows that p in Gettier cases.
2. It is not the case that S knows that p in Gettier cases.
3. Therefore, either ¬(K = JTB) or ¬(A1).
As in the case of scientific theories, logic alone tells us that there is an error somewhere but it does not tell us where. That is, it may be the case
that (K = JTB) is false but it may also be the case that (A1) is false. To
justifiably derive the negation of (K = JTB), then, we need good reasons
to prefer the first disjunct, i.e., ¬(K = JTB), and reject the second disjunct, i.e., ¬(A1). If we do not have good reasons to reject ¬(A1), then
we are not justified in deriving the negation of (K = JTB).
In other words, to justifiably derive the negation of JTB, we need
good reasons to think that (A1) is true. Accordingly, those who claim
that (MCE) can be used to refute JTB have to show why we should reject a simple theory on account of an intuitive judgment,4 an intuitive
judgment that, pace Williamson (2013), is probably rather idiosyncratic,
since it varies across cultures [Stich (2013)] and is subject to all sorts of
effects, such as the epistemic side-effect effect [Buckwalter (2014a)] and
the Knobe effect [Beebe and Shea (2013)].5 In his recent review of Alexander (2012), Williamson writes:
In both everyday and scientific situations, when I say that P, I would say
that P, and (if I am sincere) it seems to me that P. If I am not idiosyncratic, we
would say that P, and it seems to us that P. If I believe that I am not idiosyncratic, I believe that what we would say, and how things seem to us, is that
P (emphasis added) [Williamson (2013), pp. 467-474].

Williamson may believe that his intuitions are not idiosyncratic but empirical evidence suggests otherwise. At the very least, now that the empirical evidence is out there, one cannot assume without argument that
one’s intuitions are not idiosyncratic [cf. Nichols and Ulatowski (2007)].
Even if intuitions are not idiosyncratic, the basic methodological point
still stands, namely, ¬(K = JTB) cannot be justifiably derived from
premises about intuitive judgments in response to Gettier cases unless
we have good reasons to think that (A1) is true.
Similarly, as far as the Kripke-style counterexamples against the
Description Theory of Names are concerned, we need to add the following auxiliary assumption to the argument:
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(A2) Making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases
about proper names is a good method for finding out truths about
the semantics of proper names.

Accordingly, Kripke’s argument against the Description Theory of
Names needs to be revised as follows:
1. If names are definite descriptions and (A2), then ‘Gödel’ = ‘the
person who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic’ in the Gödel-Schmidt case.
2. It is not the case that ‘Gödel’ = ‘the person who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic’ in the Gödel-Schmidt case.
3. Therefore, either names are not definite descriptions or ¬(A2).
Again, as in the case of scientific theories, logic alone tells us that there is an
error somewhere but it does not tell us where. That is, it may be the case
that the Description Theory of Names is false but it may also be the case
that (A2) is false. To justifiably derive the negation of the Description Theory of Names, then, we need good reasons to prefer the first disjunct,
i.e., ‘names are not definite descriptions’, and reject the second disjunct, i.e.,
¬(A2). If we do not have good reasons to reject ¬(A2), then we are not
justified in deriving the negation of the Description Theory of Names. In
other words, those who claim that (MCE) can be used to refute the Description Theory of Names have to show why we should reject a simple
theory on account of an intuitive judgment, an intuitive judgment that is
probably rather idiosyncratic.6 Even if intuitions are not idiosyncratic, the
basic methodological point still stands, namely, that the negation of the
Description Theory of Names cannot be justifiably derived from premises about intuitive judgments in response to Gödel-Schmidt cases unless
we have good reasons to think that (A2) is true.
In fact, there might even be a good reason to reject (AA) rather
than the target philosophical theory. That is, as far as scientific theories
are concerned, we sometimes have good reasons to think that our testing
methods are reliable, and so we reject the scientific theories that conflict
with evidence obtained by means of these methods. A case in point is
the Ptolemaic model and the telescope [Kitcher (2001)]. Once Galileo had
established, to the satisfaction of his contemporaries, that the telescope is a
trustworthy instrument of celestial observation, the observational evidence
obtained by means of the telescope (e.g., Jupiter’s moons) was then used
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as evidence against the Ptolemaic model. That is, the Ptolemaic model
made a prediction that turned out to be false:
(T  A) ⟶ P
¬P
∴ ¬T  ¬A
Since Galileo had provided good reasons to think that A (i.e., that the
telescope is a trustworthy instrument of celestial observation) is true, the
falsity of the Ptolemaic model could be justifiably derived:
¬T  ¬A
A
∴ ¬T
As far as philosophical theories are concerned, however, we do not seem
to have good reasons to think that our testing methods are reliable. In
fact, as I have argued elsewhere (2014), these methods might even be unreliable. In my (2014) I argue that hypothetical cases, or “intuition
pumps,” are bad epistemic circumstances, which is why making intuitive
judgments in response to such hypothetical cases is not a reliable method
of fixing philosophical belief. Now, since (MCE) presupposes that the
method of cases (i.e., the method of making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases) is a reliable method of fixing philosophical
belief, if the method of cases is unreliable, as I have argued in my (2014),
then it follows that (MCE) is unreliable as well. In any case, just as the
burden of proof was on Galileo to show that the telescope is a reliable
instrument for celestial observation, the burden of proof is on those who
wish to use (MCE) to show that it is a reliable method for refuting philosophical theories.
IV. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
In this section, I discuss several objections to my overall argument,
which is outlined in Section 1. The first objection is motivated by something that Kripke says in Naming and Necessity. Kripke writes:
Of course, some philosophers think that something’s having intuitive content is very inconclusive evidence in favor of it. I think it is very heavy evidence in favor of anything, myself. I really don’t know, in a way, what
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more conclusive evidence one can have about anything, ultimately speaking [Kripke (1980), p. 42].

Inspired by Kripke, then, some might object to my overall argument by
claiming that (MCE) is either the only method or the best method we have
for testing philosophical theories.
I think it is clear, however, that these are rather weak objections.
Even if method M is the only method we have, it does not necessarily
follow that M is a good or a reliable method. Similarly, from the fact that
method M is the best method we have, it does not necessarily follow that
M is a good or a reliable method. Our best method could be the best of a
bad lot. In any case, we would still need good reasons to think that intuitions should count more heavily than theories, such that if theory and intuition
clash, it is always theory that should yield to intuition.
In the case of scientific theories, I submit, it would be rather unreasonable to argue that scientific theory T should always be rejected if it
clashes with our intuitions. For example, quantum mechanics has several
counterintuitive implications. But no scientist would argue that quantum
mechanics’ counterintuitive implications should count as conclusive evidence against it. So why is it that a philosophical theory’s counterintuitive implications should always count as conclusive evidence against it?
Indeed, one could argue that the history of science teaches us that
we should not trust our intuitions completely, as far as theories and their
predictions are concerned. For example, Aristotelian physics seemed intuitive enough until Galileo came along and showed that, despite its intuitive appeal, it is probably wrong, particularly in its claims about motion.
Similarly, Newtonian mechanics seemed intuitive enough until Einstein
came along and showed that, despite its intuitive appeal, is it probably
wrong, particularly in its claims about space and time. Based on these,
and other similar examples, one could argue that the historical record
teaches us that the intuitive or counterintuitive content of a theory
should not count as conclusive evidence either for or against it.
Some might also object to my argument by invoking the “expertise
defense.” According to the expertise defense, philosophers are experts,
and only the intuitions of experts should count as evidence in philosophical arguments.7 If this is correct, then (AA), (A1), and (A2) should be
amended as follows:
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(AA*) Experts making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases is a good method for finding out truths about the
subject matter of those cases.
(A1*) Epistemologists making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases about knowledge is a good method for finding out truths about the analysis of knowledge.
(A2*) Philosophers of language making intuitive judgments in response
to hypothetical cases about proper names is a good method
for finding out truths about the semantics of proper names.
Note, however, that invoking the expertise defense does nothing to
change the basic methodological point of this paper, namely, that all that
can be justifiably derived from an argument that employs (MCE) is a disjunction, i.e., ¬T  ¬A, rather than a refutation, i.e., ¬T. To see why,
consider the argument against JTB again. Even if we supplement it with
(A1*) instead of (A1) as follows:
1. If (K = JTB) and (A1*), then S knows that p in Gettier cases.
2. It is not the case that S knows that p in Gettier cases.
3. Therefore, either ¬(K = JTB) or ¬(A1*).
All that can be justifiably inferred from the premises of this argument is
a disjunction, namely, ‘either ¬(K = JTB) or ¬(A1*)’, not a conclusive
refutation of JTB, i.e., ¬(K = JTB). We can justifiably derive ¬(K = JTB)
only if we have good reasons to think that (A1*) is true. One is not entitled to assume without argument that JTB must yield to the Gettier intuition expressed in the second premise of this argument against JTB.
Likewise, even if we supplement the argument against the Description Theory of Names with (A2*) instead of (A2) as follows:
1. If names are definite descriptions and (A2*), then ‘Gödel’ = ‘the
person who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic’ in the GödelSchmidt case.
2. It is not the case that ‘Gödel’ = ‘the person who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic’ in the Gödel-Schmidt case.
3. Therefore, either names are not definite descriptions or ¬(A2*).
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All that can be justifiably inferred from the premises of this argument is
a disjunction, namely, ‘either names are not definite descriptions or
¬(A2*)’, not a conclusive refutation of the Description Theory of
Names. We can justifiably derive the negation of the Description Theory
of Names only if we have good reasons to think that (A2*) is true.8 One
is not entitled to assume without argument that the Description Theory
of Names must yield to the Kripke intuition expressed in the second
premise of this argument against the Description Theory of Names.
Are there good arguments for rejecting a philosophical theory T
(e.g., JTB or the Description Theory of Names) in favor of (AA*) [e.g.,
(A1*) or (A2*)]? To the best of my knowledge, there aren’t any in the extant literature on philosophical methodology. In the extant literature on
philosophical methodology, appeals to intuitive appearances or intellectual seemings are usually supported by analogy with sensory appearances
or perceptual seemings. For instance, according to Hales, “if we regard
sense perception as a mental faculty that (in general) delivers justified beliefs, then we should treat intuition in the same manner” [Hales (2012),
p. 180.]9 Even if the perception-intuition analogy holds, however, it
merely provides a reason to believe that, if perceptual beliefs are justified,
then intuitive beliefs are justified as well, not that intuitions should count
more heavily than theories, evidentially speaking. For recall that the
question is why should theory always yield to intuition? In other words, as far as
applications of (MCE) are concerned, why prefer ¬T over ¬A? Even if
sense perception and intuition are analogous in epistemically relevant respects, it does not follow that intuitions evidentially outweigh philosophical theories such that theories should always be rejected when they are at
odds with intuitions. Even in science, observations do not always count
more heavily than theories, as the case of the discovery of Neptune
demonstrates [Rosenberg (2000), pp. 139-140].
Again, I think that whether the intuitions in question are those of
experts or non-experts makes no difference at all. Here is another reason
why. Presumably, the reason why we would give more evidential weight
to the intuitive judgments of experts, as opposed to the intuitive judgments of non-experts, in philosophical arguments is that we think that
the intuitive judgments of experts are significantly more likely to be true.
In other words, those who appeal to the expertise defense endorse
something like the following principle:
(E) Judgment J is significantly more likely to be true when made by
an expert than when made by a non-expert.
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However, research on expertise shows that (E) is probably false. To cite
just one out of many studies as an example, Camerer and Johnson (1991)
found that decisions made by experts are often no more accurate than
decisions made by non-experts.10 If this is correct, then, even if philosophers
are expert intuiters, their intuitive judgments are not significantly more likely to be true than the intuitive judgments of non-experts. Some experimental evidence is already suggesting that that is the case.11 If that is the
case, then there is no reason to give the intuitive judgments of philosophers more weight in philosophical arguments.
If the aforementioned considerations are correct, then the two instances of (MCE) discussed above, namely, the argument against JTB
from Gettier cases and the argument against the Description Theory of
Names from Gödel-Schmidt cases, and others like them, do not amount
to conclusive refutations of the philosophical theories they target. In
general, it is not the case that an argument that employs (MCE) amounts
to a conclusive refutation of a philosophical theory T. For, without good
reasons to think that philosophical theories must always yield to intuitions, all that can be justifiably inferred from the premises of the modus
tollens argument in Step 2 of (MCE), after taking the fact of confirmation
holism into account, is a disjunction, i.e., ¬T  ¬A, not a conclusive refutation of T, i.e., ¬T.
To be clear, I am not defending JTB as an analysis of knowledge.
Nor am I defending the Description Theory of Names. Rather, I use
these two examples to illustrate a methodological point about philosophical argumentation. The point is that, pace the philosophical hype about
counterexamples, the method of counterexamples (MCE) does not allow
one to conclusively refute a philosophical theory. This is so because,
without good reasons to think that philosophical theories must always
yield to intuitions, all that can be justifiably derived from an argument
that employs (MCE) is a disjunction: either the theory is false or an auxiliary assumption is false. Since we have no reason to think that the auxiliary assumption is true, we are not entitled to conclude that the target
theory is false.
I am also not saying that intuitions do not play any evidential role
whatsoever in philosophical argumentation [cf. Cappelen (2012)]. Instead, I am saying that intuitions cannot play the role that many philosophers think they can play. That is, many philosophers think that (MCE),
which relies on appealing to intuitions, can be used to conclusively refute
philosophical theories (see the quotations in Section 1). I argue that it
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cannot, not because intuitions do not play an evidential role in philosophical argumentation, but rather because intuitions and (MCE) cannot
do the work that many philosophers think they can do.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have argued that a counterexample against a philosophical theory does not amount to conclusive evidence against that theory. Instead, all that can be justifiably derived from an argument that
employs (MCE) is a disjunction, i.e., ¬T  ¬A, because there is a crucial
auxiliary assumption that needs to be taken into account. The auxiliary
assumption is that making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases about the subject matter in question (e.g., knowledge or proper
names) is a good method for finding out truths about that subject matter. As far as scientific theories are concerned, we sometimes have good
reasons to believe that our methods work, and so we reject theories that
conflict with evidence obtained by means of these methods. As far as
philosophical theories are concerned, however, we do not seem to have
good reasons to think that our methods (specifically, the method of
counterexamples) work, and so we are not warranted in rejecting theories
that conflict with evidence obtained by means of these methods. If this is
correct, then those who wish to use (MCE) as a method for conclusive
refutation must provide an argument as to why philosophical theories
should always yield to intuitions.
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NOTES
1 By “intuition” I mean “intellectual seeming.” According to Brogaard
[(2014), pp. 382-393], intellectual seemings (‘it intellectually seems that p’) are
“seemings that result from implicit or explicit armchair reasoning, where armchair reasoning is reasoning that involves both a priori principles and past experience.” See also Boghossian (2009), Huemer (2007), Pryor (2005), and Sosa
(2009). For arguments against appealing to intuitions as a method of fixing philosophical belief, see my (2012) and (2013a).
2 On the hype surrounding Gettier’s counterexamples against JTB, see
Shope (1983) and Pollock (1986). Note that even those who dispute the lessons
of Gettier cases accept that, if Gettier cases were genuine counterexamples to
JTB, then JTB would be refuted. I argue that the method of counterexamples
simply does not allow us to refute philosophical theories, even if the counterexamples are genuine. Cf. Bonevac, Dever, and Sosa (2012).
3 On the hype surrounding Kripke’s counterexamples against the Description Theory of Names, see Linsky (2011), pp. 17-48. Note that even those who
dispute the lessons of Gödel-Schmidt cases accept that, if those cases were genuine counterexamples to the Description Theory of Names, then that theory would
be refuted. I argue that the method of counterexamples simply does not allow us
to refute philosophical theories, even if the counterexamples are genuine.
4 Cf. Bonevac, Dever, and Sosa (2012) who argue that Gettier cases are
not sufficient to refute the possibility of a conjunctive analysis of knowledge.
See also Weatherson (2003) who argues that intuitions about Gettier cases
should be explained away rather than respected. For a philosopher who rejects
the Gettier intuition outright, see Musgrave (2012).
5 See also Beebe and Buckwalter (2010), Beebe and Jensen (2012), and
Buckwalter (2014b).
6 On the idiosyncrasy of intuitions in response to Gödel-Schmidt cases,
see Machery et al (2013). Note that even if Williamson (2013) is right about intuitions, i.e., that they are not idiosyncratic, it still does not follow that (AA) is
true, and hence the basic methodological point of the paper stands, namely, that
applications of (MCE) do not amount to conclusive refutations of philosophical
theories.
7 On the expertise defense, see Williamson (2007) and (2011a). Cf.
Weinberg et al (2010) and Ryberg (2013).
8 For experimental evidence against (AA*), see Schultz et al (2011) and
Machery (2012). It is also worth noting that there are professional philosophers
who reject the Gettier intuition, e.g., Musgrave (2012).
9 Others who endorse the perception-intuition analogy include Bealer
(1998), Bonjour (1998), Chudnoff (2013), and Sosa (1996). Cf. my (2014) and
(2015).
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10 For more studies on expertise, experts’ performance and failure, see
Tetlock (2005) and Ericsson et al (2006). Additional empirical studies are cited
in my (2013b) where I argue that appeals to expert opinion are weak arguments.
11 See, e.g., Schulz et al (2011), Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012), Knobe
and Samuels (2013), and Tobia et al (2013).
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